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NOTE
Picking Fights in Missouri:
Baldwin's Non-Rule Embraces the Minority
Approach to Internet Libel Jurisdiction
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
ALLISON MARIE ISAAK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal jurisdiction is not a new concept. Rather, it is one of the oldest
principles that form the foundation and structure of the U.S. court system.
Thus, when the Internet became available to the general public in 1995,1
courts were faced with the difficulty of incorporating modem Internet situa-
tions into traditional standards of personal jurisdiction.2 Because personal
jurisdiction is rooted in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process
Clauses, 3 the preferred source of guidance in the area of Internet jurisdiction
is the U.S. Supreme Court.4 However, the Supreme Court has remained silent
on the issue, leaving the lower courts to decipher the appropriate standard
* B.A., Saint Louis University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2012; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. 1
would like to thank Professor Dennis Crouch for working as my advisor on this Note
and providing very helpful guidance in the area of Internet law. I would also like to
thank my Note and Comment Editor Darin Shreves for his incredible insights and
edits in the process of writing this Note.
1. John L. Sullivan III, Federal Courts Act as a Toll Booth to the Information
Super Highway - Are Internet Restrictions Too High ofa Price to Pay?, 44 NEw ENG.
L. REv. 935, 940 (2010).
2. See TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Ac-
tivity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519 (2004).
3. See Omni Capital Intern., Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102-03
(1987); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Ap-
proach to Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 473, 476 (2004). State long-arm
statutes also define the scope of personal jurisdiction, but because most long-arm
statutes reach the full extent allowed under the Constitution, this Note will focus pri-
marily on personal jurisdiction according to the Due Process Clause. See infra notes
62-64 and accompanying text.
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themselves. This has led to considerable divergence among the lower courts
in deciding Internet-related disputes. 6
When it comes to Internet libel across state borders, courts have been
particularly contradictory.7 Many courts continue to apply the traditional
"effects" tests of Calder v. Jones,8 despite the fact that Calder did not involve
the Internet. Although many jurisdictions use this test, courts differ in how
they interpret the three requirements, especially the second "express aiming"
9
requirement. The minority view is that express aiming requires no more
than the mere targeting of a plaintiff who resides in the forum.'0 On the other
hand, the majority view is that express aiming requires "something more"
than merely targeting a plaintiff who happens to reside in the forum; the de-
fendant must, to some extent, target the forum state as well." Even within
the majority view there are varying opinions regarding the extent to which the
defendant must target the forum state.12
Although Calder is the predominant standard of libel jurisdiction, some
courts incorporate the personal jurisdiction principles of Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewiczl 3 into their analyses of libel cases.14 However, because Burger
King was a contract case, its test is not always a perfect fit for intentional tort
situations.' 5 In the alternative, some courts have chosen to apply the frame-
work set forth in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which is a
nontraditional test catered specifically to Internet-related disputes.' 6 As if
these competing standards were not confusing enough, courts often choose to
utilize two or more standards side-by-side instead of committing to only
one.'7 This presents problems because courts seldom explain how such seem-
ingly contradictory tests relate to each other.' 8
Before Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith,19 Internet libel jurisdiction was an un-
settled issue in Missouri.20 Because it was an issue of first impression for the
5. Kyle D. Johnson, Note, Measuring Minimum Contacts over the Internet:
How Courts Analyze Internet Communications to Acquire Personal Jurisdiction Over
the Out-of-State Person, 46 U. LOUISvILLE L. REV. 313, 323 (2007).
6. See infra Part IllI.C-D.
7. See infra Part lI.C.
8. 465 U.S. 783, 787-89 (1984).
9. See infra Part III.C.
10. See Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997).
11. See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekart AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).
12. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
13. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
14. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part IlI.C.
16. See 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
17. See infra notes 130-32, 163-65 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
19. 315 S.W.3d 389 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
20. Id. at 391.
1266 [Vol. 76
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Missouri Court of Appeals, the Baldwin court faced numerous possible stand-
ards from which to choose.21 Ultimately, the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Southern District adopted the minority view of the Calder effects test.22
The court found that to satisfy the express aiming requirement of the effects
test, a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction by merely targeting a
plaintiff who resides in the forum; no extra targeting of the forum state is
necessary.23 Therefore, the court opted for the looser version of the Calder
effects test, one that allows the forum state greater leeway in reaching a non-
resident defendant.
The competing standards of Internet libel jurisdiction reflect the tensions
between the forum state's interest in providing convenient recovery for its
injured residents and the defendant's constitutional right to foresee where he
might be subject to jurisdiction. In an effort to pursue these two goals as well
as integrate modem Intemet-related concerns, lower courts have derived nu-
merous divergent tests for Internet libel jurisdiction, leaving the issue in a
state of disorder and ambiguity. To analyze this problem, this Note will first
survey the historical background of traditional personal jurisdiction princi-
ples, with particular emphasis on the U.S. Supreme Court's Calder "effects"
test.24 Then, this Note will discuss how the lower courts have interpreted and
misinterpreted Calder, as they attempt to incorporate Internet-related issues
and merge the effects test with other personal jurisdiction standards.25 Final-
ly, this Note will examine Baldwin's reasoning in light of the competing
standards for Internet libel jurisdiction and will recommend what future
courts can do to resolve the still-unsettled issues of Internet jurisdiction in
- -26Missouri.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs Mark, Carol, Theresa, and Nicole Baldwin27 are residents of
Missouri who operate a business called Whispering Lane Kennel, located
28
near Ava, Missouri. Plaintiffs breed and sell dogs, board them for pay, and
29
exhibit them at various dog shows throughout the country. Plaintiffs work
mainly with a breed of dog known as the "Chinese Crested., 30 Defendants
2 1. Id.
22. See id. at 395.
23. Id. at 396-97.
24. See infra Part IlIl.A-B.
25. See infra Part lII.C-D.
26. See infra Parts IV-V.
27. The listed plaintiffs are "husband and wife, daughter, and fifteen-year-old
granddaughter, respectively." Appellants' Brief at 2, Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d 389 (No.
SD30235), 2010 WL 1280632 at *2.
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Fischer-Smith and Hall, residents of Arizona and Pennsylvania, respectively,
are competitors of Plaintiffs in the breeding and exhibiting of Chinese Crest-
ed dogs. 3 The controversy arose when Defendants constructed an Internet
website, www.stop-whisperinglane.com,32 which they used to denigrate
Plaintiffs and their business.33 The homepage of the website, titled "STOP-
WHISPERING LANE KENNEL," named the three Plaintiffs as owners and
listed the location of the kennel in Ava, Missouri. 34 In response to the web-
35
site, Plaintiffs sued Defendants in Missouri for libel. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 36
Defendants' motion stated that Plaintiffs could not establish personal ju-
risdiction over them because they failed to show that Defendants had the min-
imum contacts in Missouri that are required for specific jurisdiction.37 Alt-
hough the circuit court found that Plaintiffs sufficiently asserted that Defend-
ants committed libel in Missouri, the court decided that Plaintiffs nevertheless
failed to show the minimum contacts necessary for specific jurisdiction over
Defendants.38 Therefore, the circuit court granted Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.39
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Plaintiffs
argued that the trial court erred in dismissing their suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction because Missouri had specific jurisdiction over the two nonresi-
31. Id.
32. Id. "The website could be viewed by anyone with internet access." Id.
33. Id. The website contained the following language:
Welcome[.] This web site has been set-up to help save others from the
fraudulent business practices of Whispering Lane Chinese Cresteds Mark.
Carol, Teresa [sic] and Nicole Baldwin. This site will explain the gross
neglect that many dogs have suffered while in their care, up to and includ-
ing death! It will also show the lack of ETHICS displayed by these so-
called breeders, as evidence of fraud and embezzlement are clearly ex-
plained.
Appellants' Brief, supra note 27, at 7.
34. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392. The opinion states that it "need[s] not further
describe the website content since defendants have not cross-appealed the finding that
plaintiffs' libel allegations are adequate." Id.
35. Id. Plaintiffs also sued Defendants on "other tort theories," which the opin-
ion does not discuss and which are irrelevant to this Note's analysis. Id.
36. Id.
37. Appellants' Brief, supra note 27, at 4. Defendants also argued in their mo-
tion that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that a tort was committed, in that they
failed to show damages. Id. Further, Defendants asserted that even if Plantiffs ade-
quately alleged that a tort was committed, the alleged tort was not committed in Mis-
souri. Id.
38. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392. Initially, the circuit court allowed Plaintiffs to
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dent Defendants under the "effects" test of Calder v. Jones.40 The Calder
effects test holds that a state can assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant who has committed (1) an intentional act (2) directed at the
state (3) causing harm the defendant knew was likely to be felt in the state.41
As the first and third parts of the effects test were easily satisfied in this case,
42Plaintiffs' argument focused primarily on the test's second part.
Plaintiffs argued that Calder defines "express aiming" as making the fo-
rum state the "focal point" of both the story and the harm suffered from the
libelous content.43 Plaintiffs acknowledged that there are diverging view-
points with regard to what "express aiming" means.44 Plaintiffs advocated
the minority position, which finds that "express aiming" occurs when a non-
resident defendant's tortious conduct adversely affects a resident of the forum
state.45 On the other hand, the majority view of "express aiming" requires
"something more" than an intentional act which harms the plaintiff in the
46forum state, i.e., some sort of additional targeting of the forum state.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs contended that even when applying the
stricter majority position, Defendants' actions satisfied the "express aiming"
element of the Calder effects test. 47 They listed several factors to support
their proposition that Defendants made Missouri the focal point of their tor-
tious conduct: (1) Defendants' website specifically targeted both residents of
and a business located in Missouri; (2) Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs
and their business were located in Missouri; (3) the website listed the exact
location of Plaintiffs' kennel in Missouri; (4) Missouri is the dog-breeding
capital of the United States; (5) Defendants' website criticized the Missouri
dog-breeding business in general; and (6) there is evidence that at least twen-
48
ty-eight residents of Missouri have accessed the website. Thus, Plaintiffs
argued that because Defendants expressly targeted Plaintiffs as residents of
Missouri, Plaintiffs' business, which is located in Missouri, and the forum
40. Appellants' Brief, supra note 27, at 22; see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984).
41. Appellants' Brief, supra note 27, at 30.
42. See id. at 30, 50-52. The first part of the effects test, the requirement of an
intentional act, was obviously satisfied, because the libel alleged in this case is an
intentional tort. Id. at 30. The third part, causing harm felt in the forum, was also
clearly satisfied; because all the Plaintiffs reside in Missouri and their business is
located in Missouri, the harm caused to Plaintiffs and their business was felt in the
forum. Id. at 50-52.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 32.
45. Id. at 31 (citing Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir.
1997)).
46. Id. (citing Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 2002)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 49-50.
2011] 1269
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state itself, Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts in Missouri to be
subject to personal jurisdiction.49
The Southern District agreed with Plaintiffs and held that when a non-
resident defendant conducts tortious activity over the Internet and expressly
aims such activity at a resident of the forum state for the purpose of causing
the resident injury there, the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts to be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state.50
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet defined the parameters of
personal jurisdiction in Internet cases, lower courts struggle to apply tradi-
tional principles of jurisdiction to more modem Internet-related disputes.
Therefore, this section will begin by briefly recounting the landmark cases
that formed the foundation of personal jurisdiction in the United States. Next,
this section will discuss the narrower spectrum of libel jurisdiction, focusing
on Calder v. Jones. This section then explains how the lower courts have
variously interpreted Calder's "effects" test as a standard of personal jurisdic-
tion. Finally, this section will examine the Internet's influence on traditional
personal jurisdiction standards and whether the courts can establish a unitary
approach to personal jurisdiction in all types of Internet-related disputes.
A. BrieffHistory ofPersonal Jurisdiction
Although modem principles of personal jurisdiction are rooted in Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process, the concept of jurisdiction goes back as
early as fifteenth-century England with the common law doctrine of coram
non judice.5 The phrase, which translates to "before a person not a judge,"
meant that there must be a "lawful judicial authority" present in order for a
52proceeding to yield a legal, binding judgment. Then, in the landmark 1877
decision Pennoyer v. Neff the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time declared
that a judgment of a state court lacking personal jurisdiction violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.53 The Court stated that in
order for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant, "he must be
brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his
49. See id. at 50.
50. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 396-97 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
51. Burnham v. Superior Court, 496 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1990).
52. See id. at 609.
53. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
1270 [ Vol. 76
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voluntary appearance."54 Therefore, due process permitted service of process
to extend no further than the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state.55
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the limiting of ser-
vice of process to a forum state's geographical borders experienced a dra-
matic transformation due to "changes in the technology of transportation and
communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity."ss
States began to create legal fictions that allowed them to relax their strict
jurisdictional boundaries and reach nonresident defendants.57 For example,
states required that nonresident corporations appoint an in-state agent to re-
ceive service of process as a condition of doing business within the forum
state. Finally, in the 1945 decision International Shoe, the Supreme Court
redefined personal jurisdiction by dispensing with the "unbending territorial
limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer."59 The Court held that in order
for a court to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant
must have "sufficient contacts or ties with the . .. forum to make it reasonable
and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice."60 Thus, from this decision, courts have derived the general standard
that a nonresident defendant not physically present in the forum may be sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction if he has sufficient minimum contacts in the fo-
rum state and the litigation arises out of those contacts.6'
To obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant, a court must satisfy not
only the "minimum contacts" requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause but also, as a threshold matter, the provisions of its
state's long-arm statute.62 However, because most states' long-arm statutes
reach the full extent permitted by the Constitution,63 lower courts mainly look
to decisions of the Supreme Court for guidance in jurisdictional issues.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed jurisdic-
54. Id
55. See id
56. Burnham, 496 U.S. at 617.
57. Id.
58. Id. States also allowed in-state "substituted service" for nonresident motor-
ists who caused injury in the state and left before process could be served upon them.
Id.
59. Id. at 618; see Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
60. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
61. See Burnham, 496 U.S. at 618.
62. Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in De-
termining Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAW. 601, 605 (2003).
63. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Maryland's Diminished Long-Arm Jurisdiction in the
Wake of Zavian v. Foudy, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001); see, e.g., Bryant v.
Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (stating
that Missouri's long-arm statute is construed to extend personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause).
64. Borchers, supra note 4, at 476.
201 1] 1271
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tional issues in the context of the Internet.6 5 In this vacuum, lower courts
struggle to apply traditional, pre-Internet personal jurisdiction principles to
66contemporary Internet-related disputes. Particularly, in Internet libel cases,
courts may rely on two relatively recent Supreme Court cases that dealt with
libel jurisdiction. 67
B. Libel Jurisdiction
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Kathy Keeton, a resident of New York,
filed a libel claim in New Hampshire against Hustler Magazine, Inc., ("Hus-
tler") an Ohio corporation whose principal place of business was in Califor-
nia.68 Keeton alleged that Hustler libeled her in five separate issues of its
magazine. 69 Although Keeton filed her claim in New Hampshire, her only
connection with the state was that a magazine that she assisted in producing
was circulated there. 70 Hustler's contacts with New Hampshire involved the
sale of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationwide magazine in
that state each month.7
Although New Hampshire was just one of the fifty states in which Hus-
tler magazine was circulated, the Supreme Court held that "[Hustler's] regu-
lar circulation of magazines in the forum State [was] sufficient to support an
assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the maga-
zine."72 While the Court acknowledged the fact that the bulk of the harm
done to Keeton had occurred outside of New Hampshire, it stated that such
will be true of almost any libel case not filed in the plaintiffs domicile and
that there was no reason to confine libel actions to the plaintiffs home state.73
The Court indicated that while the plaintiffs home forum may be relevant to
the determination of the defendant's minimum contacts, it is certainly not
dispositive. 74 Instead, the Court instructed that the primary focus is on the
defendant's contacts with the forum - not the plaintiffs.75 Further, although
the lower appellate court had been concerned with Keeton's obvious forum-
shopping - New Hampshire was the only state in which the statute of limita-
tions had not already run on her claim - the Supreme Court quickly dispensed
65. Johnson, supra note 5, at 323.
66. Borchers, supra note 4, at 476.
67. Id. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).




72. Id. at 773-74.
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76
with this issue. The Court stated that "[t]he chance duration of statutes of
limitations in nonforum jurisdictions has nothing to do with the contacts
among [Hustler], New Hampshire, and this multistate libel action."7 7
The same year the Supreme Court decided Keeton, it decided another
major libel case, Calder v. Jones.78 In Calder, Shirley Jones, a resident of
California, filed a libel claim in her home state against the National Enquirer,
Inc. (the Enquirer), its local distributing company, and two of its employees.79
The Enquirer was a corporation with its state of incorporation and principal
place of business both located in Florida. Although the Enquirer distributed
its weekly magazine in all fifty states, its highest circulation was in Califor-
nia.8 1 Jones alleged that the Defendants libeled her in one of the Enquirer's
magazine articles.82 The two Defendants, Florida residents who were the
author and the editor of the article, claimed that California lacked personal
jurisdiction over them.83 However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that jurisdiction was proper in California because the Defendants "knew that
the brunt of [Jones's] injury would be felt by [Jones] in the State in which she
lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circula-
tion."84 Thus, the Court found that jurisdiction over Defendants was "based
on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in California."85
Although the companion cases of Keeton and Calder are factually simi-
lar, Calder is, to some extent, more equitable in that the Plaintiff did not en-
gage in such conspicuous forum-shopping. 8 Further, in Calder, the state in
which the Plaintiff filed was not only the Plaintiffs home forum but also
where the libelous material had its greatest circulation. While Keeton and
Calder do not present a clear rule for libel jurisdiction, their holdings suggest
a presumption that a libel plaintiff can obtain jurisdiction over a defendant in
any state in which the circulation of the libelous material is both intentional
and substantial.
76. Id. at 778-79.
77. Id. at 779.
78. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).




83. See id. at 785-86.
84. Id. at 789-90.
85. Id. at 789.
86. Borchers, supra note 4, at 477.
87. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785.
88. Borchers, supra note 4, at 478.
2011] 1273
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C. Calder's "Express Aiming" Requirement
Although both Keeton and Calder are significant decisions in the area of
libel law, it is Calder's "effects" test that has emerged as the standard for
personal jurisdiction in intentional tort cases. Unfortunately, this seemingly
simple test has proven difficult to apply, thus giving way to a variety of inter-
pretations by the lower courts.90
The greatest divergence of opinion has been with regard to the second,
"express aiming" requirement.91 The Calder opinion itself vaguely states that
the defendant must "know" that the injury will be felt by the plaintiff in the
forum state.92 However, exactly what type of mens rea the defendant must
possess is unclear from this language. 93 For instance, must the defendant
have a "desire or purpose" to harm the plaintiff in the forum, or need the
defendant only be "aware" that such harm would occur to the plaintiff in the
forum? 94 In the alternative, is jurisdiction proper merely when the defendant
"should have known" that the harm would occur to the plaintiff in the forum
state? 95 Further, Calder did not elaborate upon whether the defendant must
expressly aim his conduct at the forum state or whether it is sufficient that the
defendant aim his conduct at a particular plaintiff who happens to be in the
forum state; that is, courts differ on the extent to which the defendant must
target the forum state itself.9 6
Although the federal circuits have varying interpretations of the "ex-
press aiming" component of the "effects" test, the majority view requires
something more than the mere targeting of a plaintiff who happens to reside
in the forum state.97 Yet even within this majority, there are slight variations
as to what "something more" entails. For instance, the Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits have indicated that injury felt by a plaintiff in the forum with-
89. See Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
90. C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unifled Test of
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Pur-
pose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 611 (2006).
91. Id. at 618. The express aiming requirement has inspired the most controver-
sy because it is "a concept which does not define itself, and has not been adequately
defined." Peter Singleton, Personal Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 911, 932 (2008).
92. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) ("[Defendants'] intentional,
and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at [the forum state]. [Defendants
wrote and] edited an article that they knew would have a potentially devastating im-
pact upon [Plaintiff]. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by
respondent in the State in which she lives and works . . . .").
93. See Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 618.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 618-19.
97. See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekart AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998).
1274 [Vol. 76
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out other contacts of the defendant is not enough to satisfy Calder.98 Howev-
er, none of these circuits spells out exactly what those "other contacts" might
be. 99
Other circuits have been more illustrative of what constitutes "some-
thing more." These circuits also keep close to Calder's language by main-
taining that simple "knowledge" of harmful effects in the forum state will
suffice. For instance, the First Circuit has held that to satisfy the express
aiming requirement, the defendant must be aware that a substantial portion of
the harm would occur in the forum state. 00 The Fifth Circuit more specifical-
ly states that to satisfy the express aiming requirement, the defendant cannot
merely target a particular plaintiff who is located in some unidentified place;
rather, the defendant must know the forum state in which the plaintiff will
experience the brunt of the harm.' 0' In other words, the fact that the plaintiff
resides and suffers harm in the forum state is not enough to fulfill the inten-
tional targeting requirement of the Calder effects test.102
Yet other circuits have expanded Calder to include an element of specif-
ic intent with regard to the forum state. The Third Circuit stated that the de-
fendant's mere targeting of a plaintiff who he knows is located in the forum is
insufficient; the defendant must "'manifest behavior intentionally targeted at
and focused on' the forum."'o3 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
have held that express aiming requires more than just foreseeability of harm-
ful effects in the forum state;'s" it requires that the defendant intentionally
98. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 797 (8th Cir. 2010) ("We therefore
construe the Calder effects test narrowly, and hold that, absent additional contacts,
mere effects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction."); Air
Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int'l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 2007) ("The
Sixth Circuit, as well as other circuits, have narrowed the application of the Calder
'effects test,' such that the mere allegation of intentional tortious conduct which has
injured a forum resident does not, by itself, always satisfy the purposeful availment
prong."); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 1997) (stat-
ing that mere injury to the plaintiff in the forum, "when unaccompanied by other
contacts . . . is ultimately too unfocused to justify personal jurisdiction").
99. See, e.g., Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (failing to explain what "additional con-
tacts" with the forum state are required to confer personal jurisdiction); ESAB Grp.,
126 F.3d at 626 (failing to describe the "other contacts" that must accompany injury
to the plaintiff in the forum).
100. Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1998).
101. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002).
102. Id. at 473.
103. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
ESAB Grp., 126 F.3d at 625 (4th Cir. 1997)).
104. Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1077 (10th
Cir. 2008); Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006).
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target the forum state with knowledge that the plaintiff will suffer harm
there. 105
Finally, in a case factually similar to Baldwin, Tamburo v. Dworkin,106
the Seventh Circuit also asserted its requirement of specific intent in the Cal-
der effects test.107 In that case, Tamburo, an Illinois resident who designed
software for dog breeders, sued Kristen Henry, Roxanne Hayes, Karen Mills,
and Steven Dworkin, dog breeders who were located in Colorado, Michigan,
Ohio, and Canada, respectively, due to libelous statements they posted on
their websites regarding Tamburo.1os The main issue on appeal to the Sev-
enth Circuit was "whether the defendants 'purposefully directed' their con-
duct at the forum state" according to the Calder effects test.10 9 The court
recognized that there were numerous viewpoints regarding the express aiming
requirement of Calder.110 However, the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that
"[tlortious acts aimed at a target in the forum state and undertaken for the
express purpose of causing injury there are sufficient to satisfy Calder's ex-
press-aiming requirement.""'
In contrast to the majority of circuit courts that believe the defendant
must, at a minimum, knowingly target the forum state, the minority of circuits
holds that something less than "awareness" of effects in the forum state will
suffice. The Second Circuit states that the defendant must have "reason to
believe" that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum.112 In effect, a
defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction if a court determines that he
should have known his conduct would cause harmful effects in the forum
state.113 Yet, by far the most liberal interpretation of the Calder effects test is
that of the Eleventh Circuit, which maintains that a defendant may be subject
to personal jurisdiction if he commits an intentional tort expressly aimed at a
resident of the forum state, the effects of which are suffered by the resident in
the forum.114 This rule basically states that jurisdiction is proper wherever
the victim of an intentional tort resides. Thus, unlike the other circuits'
standards of the "express aiming" component, the Eleventh Circuit requires
no mens rea with regard to the forum state.
105. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1077; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,
420 (9th Cir. 1997).
106. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
567 (2010).
107. See id. at 707-08.
108. Id. at 698. Defendants had libeled Tamburo on their website by posting
statements accusing him of theft, hacking, selling stolen goods, and calling on readers
to boycott his products. See id.
109. Id. at 702.
110. Id. at 704.
111. Id. at 707.
112. Chaiken v. VV Publ'g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1029 (2d Cir. 1997).
113. See id
114. Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Although several Missouri cases cite Calder,"5 no case had interpreted
the express aiming requirement of the effects test until Baldwin v. Fischer-
Smith.' The closest any Missouri case had come to offering guidance on
issues of libel jurisdiction was the recent Supreme Court of Missouri case,
Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Group, Inc.117 In that case, Bryant, a Mis-
souri resident, filed claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent
concealment against Smith Interior, a Florida corporation, and its president,
William Kopp, a Florida resident. Because Bryant is a fraudulent misrep-
resentation case, not a libel case, it did not touch upon the Calder test. How-
ever, because it involved nonresident defendants committing an intentional
tort against a Missouri plaintiff, the court still had to analyze the defendants'
minimum contacts in Missouri for purposes of determining specific jurisdic-
tion.'
In evaluating the defendants' minimum contacts, the court looked to
whether the defendants "purposefully avail[ed]" themselves of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum and asked whether the litigation arose
out of such activities.1 20 The court found that the defendants possessed the
requisite minimum contacts in Missouri because they knowingly mailed
fraudulent documents to the plaintiff in Missouri and thus purposefully
availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in the forum.' 2 1
The Bryant court's "purposefully avail" language derives from the fa-
mous personal jurisdiction case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.122 That
case, which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court a year after Calder, stat-
ed that for jurisdiction to be proper, the defendant must "purposefully avail[]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 23 The Court's primary
focus was not on the defendant's intent to cause injury in the forum, but in-
stead on the activities by which the defendant deliberately reached out to do
business with a corporation located in the forum.124
However, Burger King also refers to the standard as requiring that the
defendant "purposefully direct[] his activities at residents of the forum," that
115. See, e.g., State ex rel. William Ranni Assocs., Inc. v. Hartenbach, 742
S.W.2d 134, 138 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Beckers v. Seck, 14 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2000); Elaine K. v. Augusta Hotel Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 850 S.W.2d 376,
378 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993); Breen v. Jarvis, 761 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Mo. App. E.D.
1988).
116. See Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
117. 310 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
118. Id. at 230.
119. Id. at 232.
120. Id. at 232-33.
121. Id. at 234-35.
122. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
123. Id at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
124. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 607-08.
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the defendant "purposefully establish 'minimum contacts' in the forum state,"
and that the defendant "purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws."l25 Due to these varying formulations of the "purposeful
availment" standard, the test leads to different results in different cases.126
Because Burger King is a contract case, not an intentional tort case,
some courts have chosen to confine the purposeful availment standard to con-
tract disputes. 127 Other courts have either equated the two tests and used
them interchangeablyl28 or utilized both without explaining their relation-
ship.129 Regardless of how the lower courts view the relationship between
Calder and Burger King, the Supreme Court has adopted two apparently di-
vergent standards for personal jurisdiction, with Calder leading the intention-
al tort cases and Burger King guiding the contract cases.130 While the Calder
line of cases places more emphasis on the defendant being, to varying de-
grees, aware of a particular plaintiff's identity and residence in the forum,131
the Burger King line of cases does not require the defendant to target any
specific plaintiff in the forum.132 Rather, Burger King requires that the de-
fendant's business activities have a foreseeable effect in the forum in gen-
eral.133 This distinction raises the question: why is knowledge of the plain-
tiff's identity and location so vital in the Calder test but not in the Burger
King analysis? 34
Professors C. Douglas Floyd and Shima Baradaran-Robison of Brigham
Young University Law School opine that in both contexts, the Supreme Court
is concerned with whether the defendant has sufficient notice of the particular
geographical location in which he could be subject to suit. 135 For instance, in
125. Id. at 621 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 623-24. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
797, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2004); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455
(3d Cir. 2003); Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 257-60 (3d Cir. 2001).
128. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 622-23; see, e.g., Harris Rut-
sky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.
2003); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1997);
Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 595-96 (E.D. Va.
2003).
129. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 624; see, e.g., Griffis v. Lu-
ban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 532 (Minn. 2002).
130. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 633.
131. Id. at 636.
132. Id. at 627.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 636.
135. Id. This "notice" is not to be confused with the notice required by service of
process. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) ("We are
likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon an
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commercial transaction cases following Burger King, the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in any state where he purposeful-
ly avails of the privilege of conducting business activities; thus, no additional
knowledge of the exact plaintiff being harmed is required.136 Floyd and
Baradaran-Robison believe that most intentional tort cases can be treated
similarly: if a defendant has engaged in tortious conduct that he knows will
create a risk of harm in the forum state, he should reasonably expect being
subject to suit in that state.' 37
On the other hand, the professors argue that some intentional tort cases
do require that the defendant have extra knowledge of the plaintiffs identity
and location in order for the defendant to be properly notified of the location
in which he could be subject to personal jurisdiction.138 For example, in libel
cases, the brunt of the harm occurs where the plaintiffs reputation is dam-
aged, which depends on where the plaintiff is most well-known, naturally
tending to be where the plaintiff lives and works.139 Therefore, merely en-
gaging in defamatory conduct does not automatically signal to the defendant
the state in which he will be subject to jurisdiction.140 Rather, for the defend-
ant to adequately foresee where he could be subject to suit, the defendant
must have some additional knowledge of the plaintiffs identity and loca-
tion.141
Missouri courts do not seem to have taken a direct stance on the rela-
tionship between the Calder and Burger King standards. Although Bryant
applied the Burger King standard to a fraudulent misrepresentation case,
which is an intentional tort action, the situation that gave rise to the tort was a
business deal gone wrong.142 The court might have thought that the Calder
effects test was inappropriate given the contractual context of the case.
Whatever the reasoning, the Bryant court chose to utilize the Burger King
purposeful availment standard without the slightest mention of Calder.
D. Internet Jurisdiction
Although courts frequently apply the Calder effects test to Internet in-
tentional tort cases, there exists another line of cases that is especially tailored
to Internet law. Since the advent of the World Wide Web, courts have been
searching for a unitary approach to personal jurisdiction in all Internet cas-
agent whose activities establish appellant's 'presence' there was not sufficient notice
of the suit. . . .").
136. Floyd & Baradaran-Robinson, supra note 90, at 636.
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es.143 Because the Supreme Court has remained relatively silent with regard
to Internet jurisdiction, the legal world has instead looked to innovative cases
among the lower courts for guidance.144
The first pioneer of Internet personal jurisdiction was Inset Systems, Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc.145 from the United States District Court of Connecti-
cut.146 In this case, Inset Systems, a Connecticut corporation, registered for
the federal trademark "INSET"; subsequently, Instruction Set, a Massachu-
setts corporation, began using the Internet domain address "INSET.COM" to
advertise its own goods and services.147 Inset Systems then sued in its home
forum of Connecticut, alleging Instruction Set's actions constituted trademark
infringement.148 Instruction Set argued that the court lacked personal juris-
diction because Instruction Set did not have sufficient minimum contacts in
Connecticut.149 However, the court disagreed, holding that "since [Instruc-
tion Set] purposefully directed its advertising activities toward this state on a
continuing basis . . . it could reasonably anticipate the possibility of being
haled into court here." 50 Although Instruction Set's website was available to
all states - not just Connecticut - the court found that because of the continu-
ous availability of the defendant's advertisements to any Internet user, the
defendant purposefully availed itself of conducting business in the forum
state.' 5 ' Therefore, under the Inset System court's reasoning, a website that
advertised a defendant's goods and services could subject the defendant to
personal jurisdiction in any state in which that website could be viewed.1 52
Inset System's extremely liberal understanding of Internet jurisdiction
was consistent with the emerging view that purposeful availment occurred
wherever a website could be viewed. However, another case soon came
along and supplanted Inset System's loose standard of Internet jurisdiction
with a more stringent framework. Like Inset System, Zippo Manufacturing
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.154 was a federal district court decision that
achieved a surprisingly robust following from other courts. 5 5
143. Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of
a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1147, 1149
(2005).
144. See id at 1156.
145. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
146. Yokoyama, supra note 143, at 1156.
147. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162-63.
148. Id. at 163.
149. Id. at 164.
150. Id. at 165.
15 1. Id.
152. See id
153. Yokoyama, supra note 143, at 1157.
154. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
155. Yokoyama, supra note 143, at 1166-67.
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Zippo's framework for determining personal jurisdiction in Internet cas-
es is based on the level of interactivity of the website at issue. 156 The stand-
ard set out a "continuum, or 'sliding scale,' for measuring Web sites, which
fall into one of three general categories: (1) passive, (2) interactive, or (3)
integral to the defendant's business." 57 Passive websites, which simply dis-
play information to online viewers, do not implicate personal jurisdiction
over the defendant website creator.5 Interactive websites, which allow In-
ternet users to communicate with the site host, may subject the website crea-
tor to personal jurisdiction, depending on the level of interactivity and the
extent to which the site is used for commercial purposes. 159 Finally, "inte-
gral" websites, which defendants use to enter into contracts with out-of-state
individuals through the repeated, online transfer of computer files, undoubt-
edly trigger the exercise of personal jurisdiction.'60
Despite the fact that Zippo came not from the Supreme Court but from a
federal district court, six federal circuits have chosen to recognize or adopt its
sliding scale means for determining personal jurisdiction in Internet cases.161
Although Zippo was a trademark infringement case, its sliding scale approach
has been applied to a variety of other Internet-based claims.162 In the area of
Internet libel, many courts apply both Calder and Zippo side-by-side, assert-
ing that they are not in tension.163 Some courts use Zippo as a threshold anal-
ysis; if the website is sufficiently interactive under Zippo, the court proceeds
to the Calder effects test.16 Other courts use a sort of Calder/Zippo hybrid
test for Internet libel jurisdiction.165 However, the Zippo framework does not
always make practical sense when applied to certain causes of action, particu-
larly Internet libel.166 For instance, one might ask how the interactivity of a
website has anything to do with the harm suffered by a plaintiff.167 Despite
the Zippo test's less-than-perfect fit in the area of Internet libel, courts more
often look to Zippo than many Supreme Court decisions. 68
156. Rice & Gladstone, supra note 62, at 618.
157. Id.; see Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
158. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Rice & Gladstone, supra note 62, at 622-23.
162. See Borchers, supra note 4, at 478.
163. See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2002).
164. See, e.g., id. at 472.
165. See, e.g., Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d
390, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2003).
166. See id. at 399-400.
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Before Baldwin, Missouri state courts had only one "website" case;169
this case did not mention Zippo, and, given that it concerned contracts, was
not particularly enlightening in the area of Internet libel jurisdiction.170
Therefore, Baldwin presented the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District with the opportunity to pave the way for future cases by setting the
standard for Internet libel jurisdiction in Missouri.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, the issue presented was whether the out-of-
state Defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri under the
Calder effects test when they published a website that libeled Plaintiffs and
their business in Missouri. 17  Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction because Defendants did not have the mini-
mum contacts required by due process.172 When the circuit court granted
Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs raised three points on appeal to the Missouri
Court of Appeals, Southern District, the principal of which was that personal
jurisdiction was proper because Defendants had the minimum contacts to
satisfy due process under the Calder effects test.173
In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Daniel Scott, the appellate court
sided with Plaintiffs, holding that when a nonresident defendant expressly
aims his tortious conduct at a resident of the forum state for the purpose of
causing the resident injury there, the defendant has sufficient minimum con-
tacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state.174 In its analy-
sis, the court relied on the traditional requirements of the Calder effects test:
(1) intentional conduct (2) explicitly targeting the forum state (3) with the
defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff would likely suffer injury in the fo-
rum state.' 7 5 The court noted that, while it is "reasonably straightforward" to
apply this test to ordinary defamation cases, the situation becomes much more
complex when the Internet is involved.176 The court acknowledged that this
issue, Internet libel jurisdiction, was one of first impression in Missouri.177
169. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 828 (Mo. App. E.D.
2000).
170. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010); see
Beer Nuts, 29 S.W.3d at 830.
171. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 392.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 396-97.
175. Id. at 393 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. at 393-94 (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 391-92. There is one prior Missouri Internet jurisdiction case, but the
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First, the court analyzed the case under the Calder effects test.178 It stat-
ed that the present dispute, like most cases, turns on the meaning of the se-
cond Calder requirement, that of "express aiming."l 79 The court recognized
that there has been substantial confusion with regard to the express aiming
component, and it listed three of the many approaches that other courts have
taken.'80 First, some courts hold that "targeting" means simply making "an
effort to reach an individual in the forum."' 8 ' Second, other courts maintain
that express aiming requires "intent to target the forum state itself" 82 Final-
ly, still others state that mere "foreseeability of effects within the forum" is
sufficient.' 83  The court noted that Plaintiffs' brief outlined approximately
seventy cases on the issue of "express aiming" alone, but the court refused to
commit to one standard to fit all Internet libel cases.184 Rather, the court stat-
ed, "Our more modest goal is to properly review the case before us and let
others ponder the grand scheme of things."'8 5
As Missouri precedent provided little to no guidance on the issue of In-
ternet libel jurisdiction, the court decided to follow the reasoning of Tamburo
v. Dworkin,186 another dog-breeding case recently decided by the Seventh
Circuit, both because it was so factually similar' 87 and it reflected the court's
views.188 Tamburo held that "[t]ortious acts aimed at a target in the forum
state and undertaken for the express purpose of causing injury there are suffi-
cient to satisfy Calder's express-aiming requirement." 89
Because the Southern District found that there was "no meaningful dif-
ference between Tamburo" and the present case, it reached the same outcome
as the Tamburo court.190 Thus, the court found that Defendants had the req-
uisite minimum contacts to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri.191
Then, the court admitted that, due to the various interpretations of "express
aiming," it could just as easily have reached a different result on the same set
178. Id. at 392-94.





184. Id. at 395.
185. Id.
186. 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 567 (2010).
187. For a summary of the facts and issues of Tamburo, see supra notes 107-11
and accompanying text.
188. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 395.
189. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 707.
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of facts.1 92 The court explained its own analysis by listing five of the reasons
it came to its conclusion.193
First, the court stated that it was not convinced Calder requires any ad-
ditional targeting of the forum state itself, instead of simply targeting a
known resident of the forum and causing injury there. 194 In Support of this
proposition, the court alluded to Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,19 5 which
stated that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper if he
"purposefully directed" his conduct "at residents of the forum" and the litiga-
tion arises out of that conduct.196 Second, the court maintained that even if
Calder does require express aiming at both the plaintiff and the forum state,
the present case meets that requirement because Defendants' website not only
made libelous statements about the Plaintiffs, but also made disparaging re-
marks about the dog-breeding laws in Missouri.' 97 Third, the court indicated
that it was not worried about the occasionally-raised concern of subjecting a
defendant to personal jurisdiction in too many fora; the fact that a defendant
is potentially subject to jurisdiction in many other states has no legal effect
whatsoever on the amount of the defendant's minimum contacts with the
forum state.198 Fourth, the court noted that the Supreme Court of Missouri
recently expressed the view that if "'the actual content of communications
with a forum gives rise to intentional tort causes of action,' . . . 'this alone
constitutes purposeful availment."'l 99 Finally, the court's fifth reason for its
decision consisted of one brief declaration: "[I]f you pick a fight in Missouri,
you can reasonably expect to settle it here."200
192. Id. at 394, 397.
193. Id. at 397-98.
194. Id. This was a departure from Tamburo, which required specific intent to
target the forum state. See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 708.
195. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
196. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
197. Id. at 397-98. Defendants' website stated:
MO has the most LAX laws when it comes to the safety and concern of
animals being housed and kept for breeding. This is why MO is knows
[sic] as the Puppy Mill capitol of the WORLD. Commercial dog breeders
from other parts of the U.S. often relocate to MO to make their living off
of dogs and puppy sales as there are few laws to force them to raise the
animals in a clean, healthy environment. There are more breeders in MO
than in most other states combined! Because there are not enough state




199. Id. (quoting Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 235
(Mo. 2010)).
200. Id. (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467,476 (5th Cir. 2002)).
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In its conclusion, the court once again asserted that it did not intend to
set a universal standard for all Internet libel jurisdiction cases.201 Rather, the
court stated, "We merely decided this case." 202 Because the court found that
Defendants satisfied the express aiming requirement of the Calder effects
test, it held that Defendants had sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to
203
personal jurisdiction in Missouri. Thus, the Southern District reversed the
trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.204
V. COMMENT
Before Baldwin, Internet jurisdiction was, for the most part, unsettled
territory in Missouri. Unfortunately, that is still true post-Baldwin. Because
205Internet libel jurisdiction was an issue of first impression in Missouri, the
Baldwin court had the opportunity to influence the standard of personal juris-
diction for all subsequent intentional tort cases involving the Internet in Mis-
souri. Instead, the court decided to confine its opinion to the facts of the case,
even explicitly stating that it did not intend to create "a decisional model to fit
all situations" 206 or "any universal rule about personal jurisdiction in
,,207[I]ntemet cases. Therefore, the court left the matter of Internet jurisdic-
tion in Missouri in as much perplexity and ambiguity as before.
Despite the fact that Baldwin refrained from creating a standard for In-
ternet libel jurisdiction, the "non-rule" that it used should nonetheless be sub-
ject to critique, as future cases may look to it for guidance. The court inter-
preted Calder's express aiming requirement, but only in the interest of decid-
ing the case.208 Faced with numerous "divergent" and "somewhat irreconcil-
209
able" analyses by other lower courts, the court ultimately construed the
express aiming component as requiring that a defendant expressly aim his
tortious conduct at the plaintiff for the purpose of causing the plaintiff injury
in the forum.2o The court stated that it was "not persuaded" that to satisfy
the express aiming component, a defendant must intentionally target the fo-
rum state itself.211 This understanding of the express aiming requirement
comports with the minority view, which does not require any extra focus on




204. Id. at 399.
205. Id. at 391.
206. Id. at 395.
207. Id. at 398.
208. See id. at 393-94.
209. Id. at 392.
210. Id. at 397 (quoting Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 709 (7th Cir. 2010)).
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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the forum - even without knowledge that the plaintiff lives in the forum - is
sufficient to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction.
The court's reason for adopting this minority position was due to the
language of Burger King, which stated that the "minimum contacts" aspect of
personal jurisdiction is satisfied when a defendant has "'purposefully di-
rected' his activities at residents of the forum." 213 But using the Burger King
"purposeful availment" standard in interpreting the Calder effects test is mis-
guided for several reasons.
First, Baldwin failed to recognize the different personal jurisdiction re-
quirements of intentional tort cases versus contract cases. On the surface, the
"purposeful availment" language of Burger King seems more appropriate for
commercial contract disputes than intentional tort cases. When one thinks of
a defendant benefiting from conducting activities in the forum state, it usually
brings to mind some kind of commercial transaction, rather than any sort of
tortious behavior. More importantly, the purposeful availment standard dis-
regards the unique aspects of minimum contacts in libel cases. Because
Burger King is a contract case214 and Calder is a libel case,215 it is only natu-
ral that the type of activity that would establish the defendant's minimum
contacts for personal jurisdiction varies with the kind of claim raised. For
example, in a contract case, an out-of-state defendant may establish minimum
contacts in the forum state by repeatedly corresponding with the plaintiffs
office in the forum state, sending notices and payments to the forum state, or
entering into a long-term relationship with a company that is incorporated in
the forum.216 On the other hand, in a libel case, a nonresident defendant may
establish minimum contacts in the forum state by publishing libelous state-
ments about the plaintiff in a newspaper that circulates in the forum state,217
21821
on national TV, or on the Internet.219
Because libel cases do not require any interaction between the parties to
establish minimum contacts, they should require a more stringent standard of
notifying the defendant that he or she may be subject to suit in the forum
state. Particularly, courts should demand that the defendant at least be aware
that the plaintiff resides in the forum state. Burger King, which was decided
subsequent to Calder, differs from Calder in that it has no requirement that
the defendant have knowledge of the plaintiffs identity and location.220 Alt-
hough this extra knowledge of the plaintiffs whereabouts is not necessary to
213. Baldwin, 315 S.W.3d at 397 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462,472 (1985)).
214. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468.
215. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984).
216. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480-81.
217. E.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90.
218. E.g., Holmes v. TV-3, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 692, 696 (W.D. La. 1991).
219. E.g., Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 611 F.3d 1368, 1370 (11th Cir.
2010) (per curiam).
220. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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give the defendant notice of potential jurisdiction in claims of contract and
most intentional torts,221 libel jurisdiction, by its very nature, should require
that the defendant be aware of who and where the particular plaintiff is.222 As
opposed to most other intentional torts and contracts cases, in which the de-
fendant almost certainly must engage in some form of interaction or commu-
nication with the plaintiff, in cases of libel, a defendant can publish defamato-
ry statements about the plaintiff in the absence of any actual interaction. As a
result, a defendant can very easily libel a plaintiff without knowing where the
plaintiff resides.
A fundamental principle of personal jurisdiction is "that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasona-
bly anticipate being haled into court there." 223 This foreseeability aspect of
personal jurisdiction analysis is vital to "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" 224 because it allows the defendant to avoid the risk of suit
in a particular jurisdiction by either acquiring insurance or leaving the
225
state. Therefore, a state should not be able to assert jurisdiction over a
defendant who publishes defamatory material about a plaintiff but has no
knowledge of where that plaintiff lives, because the defendant would not have
sufficient foreseeability that he could be subject to suit in the plaintiffs home
forum.
Further, the Baldwin court's chosen standard was erroneous because, in
fearing an excessively strict express aiming requirement, it went too far in the
other direction and applied a toothless version of the Calder effects test.
Baldwin is correct that, even under the stricter interpretation of the express
aiming requirement, the defendants satisfied the Calder effects test by specif-
ically insulting Missouri's lenient dog laws in addition to targeting the plain-
tiffs. 226 Nevertheless, the court stated that it did not believe that such addi-
tional targeting of the forum state is required under Calder.227 While the
mens rea with regard to the forum state need not be as demanding as specific
intent, the defendant should, at the very least, be aware of the geographical
scope of his tortious conduct. Yet the Southern District in Baldwin seemed
content to hold that merely libeling a plaintiff, regardless of any additional
knowledge of the tort's effect on the forum, is sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. 228
221. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
223. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
224. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 90, at 634.
226. Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W.3d 389, 397-98 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010).
227. Id. at 397.
228. See id. at 397.
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Finally, the existence or absence of personal jurisdiction turns on the ex-
tent of the defendant's contacts with the forum state, not the plaintiffs. 229 If
the Baldwin/minority view regarding the express aiming requirement were
correct, personal jurisdiction in libel cases would always be proper in the
plaintiffs home state, regardless of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
While the Supreme Court has recognized that the plaintiffs location naturally
influences personal jurisdiction analysis, it has never found that the plaintiff's
home state conclusively determines the scope of jurisdiction over the defend-
ant.230 Of course, a libel defendant often will have knowledge of the plain-
tiff's identity and location and thus be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
forum state. The Internet could make it easier or more difficult for a libel
defendant to discover who and where the plaintiff is. On one hand, the Inter-
net is a cheap and convenient research tool that can find any person almost
instantly. On the other hand, most online users employ screen names and e-
mail addresses, which sometimes indicate people's names but rarely their
locations. But the ease with which a defendant is able to research the plaintiff
does not and should not loosen the standard and permit jurisdiction over a
defendant whose only connection with the forum state is that he libeled a
plaintiff who happens to live there.
Although Baldwin was the first Missouri case dealing with Internet libel
jurisdiction, the court did not utilize the Zippo framework in its analysis. Yet
this omission was laudable, for the Zippo test has proven to be an illogical
approach to Internet jurisdiction.231 Particularly in libel cases, the level of
interactivity of a defendant's website has "little relevance" to issues of per-
sonal jurisdiction.23 Liability attaches once the defamatory message is pub-
lished; it makes no difference whether the defendant engages in further inter-
233action or dealings with the message recipients. Even the most passive
website is perfectly capable of displaying a libelous statement that could sub-
ject the website host to liability.234 The interactivity of a defendant's website
has no bearing on the extent to which the defendant has targeted the forum
state.235 Therefore, the Baldwin court properly disregarded the Zippo sliding
scale.
While Baldwin correctly ignored Zippo in its Calder analysis, the court
failed to determine a standard that adequately balanced Missouri's interests in
protecting its plaintiffs with nonresident defendants' interests in foreseeability
of personal jurisdiction. Instead of adopting the still-plaintiff friendly posi-
tion that a defendant need merely have knowledge of the plaintiffs residence
229. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984).
230. See id.
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in the forum, the court embraced the most toothless standard on the express
aiming spectrum: no additional targeting of the forum state is necessary.
Baldwin's view of the express aiming component is analogous to that of the
Eleventh Circuit, which holds that a defendant may be subject to personal
jurisdiction if he commits an intentional tort expressly aimed at a person who
happens to reside in the forum state.236 No other circuit court of appeals has
embraced such a liberal, watered-down version of Calder.237
The Baldwin/minority view of the Calder effects test ignores the U.S.
Supreme Court's mandate of "fair play" to the defendant 238 in favor of pro-
tecting residents of the forum state. This "protectionist" position advances
state concerns of sheltering its in-state plaintiffs at the expense of nonresident
defendants' constitutional right to the foreseeability of potential fora. With-
out the due process requirement of foreseeability, any "random, fortuitous, or
attenuated" 239 interaction with a state could implicate the defendant in a law-
suit. Unless the defendant has deliberately availed himself of the "benefits
and protections of the forum's laws,"240 he should not be forced "to submit to
the burdens of litigation in that forum." 241
In addition, as aforementioned, the test for specific jurisdiction depends
on the defendant's - not the plaintiffs - contacts with the forum state.242 A
plaintiff-centered standard of personal jurisdiction allows protectionist states
to bully nonresident defendants, when the entire purpose of the minimum
contacts doctrine is to protect out-of-state defendants from facing far-off
court battles. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the principle of
minimum contacts "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in
a distant or inconvenient forum" and "acts to ensure that the [s]tates . . . do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system."243 Thus, the minimum contacts requirement
relieves defendants of having to travel hundreds of miles to litigate in a state
where they have no connections and prevents the states from asserting more
jurisdictional power over nonresident defendants than the Constitution per-
mits.
Although Baldwin deliberately resisted setting a standard for Internet li-
bel jurisdiction, such a stance has nonetheless influenced Missouri case law
by creating even more confusion in the already-complex area of Internet per-
sonal jurisdiction. While Baldwin did not attempt to create a unitary rule for
all Internet jurisdiction situations, that probably will not prevent future courts
236. Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008).
237. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
238. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
239. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
240. Id. at 476 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id.
242. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984).
243. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
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from following its approach, particularly when similar cases arise. Hopeful-
ly, if the Supreme Court of Missouri is faced with an Internet libel case in the
future, that court will seize the opportunity to set the permanent standard of
Internet libel jurisdiction. With any luck, that court would improve upon the
non-rule that the Baldwin court applied.
Instead of the loose interpretation of the express aiming requirement that
Baldwin utilized, Missouri should adopt a version of the Calder effects test
that recognizes the importance of giving notice to the defendant. The test
should be narrowly tailored to libel cases only, because personal jurisdiction
244principles vary depending on the cause of action. Specifically, the standard
should require that the defendant have actual knowledge of the plaintiffs
identity and location before he can be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
forum. Otherwise, the relationship between the defendant and the forum state
is too attenuated to comport with "'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."' 245
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Baldwin failed to set the standard for Internet libel jurisdiction
in Missouri, future courts may nonetheless follow its narrow decision as prec-
edent. While the Southern District admirably refused to utilize the Zippo
framework, it regrettably incorporated Burger King's contract-focused rea-
soning into the effects test. In adopting the minority view of the Calder ef-
fects test, the court failed to observe that libel cases, in particular, should
require that the defendant have knowledge of the plaintiff's identity and loca-
tion in the forum state in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction there.
Thus, Baldwin loosened the important constitutional guarantee of providing
adequate notice to the defendant of the jurisdictional scope of his potential
liability. Due to the court's misguided holding, it is perhaps fortunate that
Baldwin specifically avoided establishing any type of jurisdictional rule.
Hopefully, the next time the issue of Internet libel jurisdiction is presented to
a Missouri court, the Supreme Court of Missouri will seize the opportunity to
establish the standard - the correct standard - once and for all.
244. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
245. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
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